The Cost of American Power in the Iran War

by Ervin Hoskins

766 words

When the United States military sets out to demonstrate its power, the language in Washington is often clinical and reassuring. Precision strikes and restored deterrence sound manageable. The bills tell a less comforting story. In a Sept. 15 assessment, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the war against Iran had cost the Pentagon about $38 billion through Aug. 1. Americans deserve to know what that enormous commitment is buying beyond the capacity to keep fighting.

An earlier inspector general report offers a closer look at the damage. It records a Pentagon estimate of $33.4 billion through June 29, including operational obligations and the replacement value of expended munitions and lost equipment. Infrastructure repairs were excluded. Much of that estimate represents the cost of replacing what the military used or lost, rather than cash already paid out. The bill will follow Americans beyond the fighting itself.

The financial price tag is only the surface of a deeper strategic problem. The same report says Iranian strikes damaged or destroyed hundreds of buildings and structures at U.S. bases across the region. Advanced defenses did not make those installations immune to attack. The damage raises an uncomfortable question: How much of the effort to project American power is now being spent protecting the infrastructure needed to sustain it?

The toll in the air adds to that burden. The report lists as many as 30 MQ-9 Reaper drones destroyed in various circumstances and seven KC-135 refueling aircraft damaged or destroyed. Two of those tankers were involved in a collision over Iraq; the other five were hit on the ground in Saudi Arabia. Refueling aircraft help other planes operate far from their bases. Damage to that fleet creates another demand on the military even as it tries to sustain an expensive campaign.

There are costs in distance and time, too. U.S. Central Command told the inspectors that shifting logistics support to Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, meant sea resupply cycles of 14 to 18 days. Moving support farther away may protect personnel and equipment, but it also makes sustaining operations harder. That is a practical limit on military power, one that confident briefings can obscure.

The report also identifies strategic shortages in munitions inventories and bottlenecks in production. Replenishing depleted weapons stocks takes time, and an appropriation cannot instantly produce a missile. The longer replenishment takes, the longer military planners must live with the consequences of today’s decisions. The costs of this campaign extend beyond the next strike.

Meanwhile, the same oversight report documents a substantial pipeline of arms sales to regional partners. Its January-June table totals about $44.5 billion, combining emergency sales with announced plans for nonemergency sales. That period began before the war. The $12 billion listed for Saudi Arabia, for example, was announced in January and early February. The pipeline therefore reflects longstanding military relationships as well as emergency demands arising during the conflict.

These sales figures describe prospective business, not profits already earned. Deliveries and payments may come later. Even so, placing them beside the war’s costs raises a question that deserves more attention: What happens when a policy that consumes public resources can also generate years of new demand for the weapons industry?

Acknowledging that tension does not require a conspiracy theory about companies engineering wars. Policymakers and businesses respond to different responsibilities and incentives. But the prospect of future contracts is no measure of whether a war is making Americans safer. The public interest requires an assessment of whether the next deployment or weapons package brings an end to the fighting closer.

Policymakers cite concerns about protecting service members, maintaining alliances and keeping shipping routes open. A serious case for peace must address those concerns. But supplying more arms and extending military operations should not escape scrutiny simply because they are familiar responses. What conditions would allow deployments to shrink? How would diplomacy reduce the threats that another round of military spending is meant to contain?

Congress should require regular public accounting that separates operating costs, replacement estimates and repair bills. Before approving additional war funding, lawmakers should demand an explanation of the diplomatic path to ending the conflict. Arms-sale reviews should consider how transfers affect prospects for de-escalation, alongside their immediate defensive purpose.

A military capable of inflicting massive tactical damage is not the same as a government capable of securing a lasting peace. The damaged bases and stretched supply lines make that distinction harder to ignore. Washington is spending billions to project power. Americans should insist on a policy that makes it less necessary to spend the next billions fighting the same war.

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Ervin Hoskins is an American freelance writer, peace advocate and anti-war activist focused on justice, equality and thoughtful analysis of international affairs.